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AUTOCRATIC STRATEGIES FOR ALTERNATING GAMES
ALEX MCAVOY AND CHRISTOPH HAUERT
Abstract. Repeated games have a long tradition in the behavioral sciences and evolutionary biology.
Recently, strategies were discovered that permit an unprecedented level of control over repeated interactions
by enabling a player to unilaterally enforce linear constraints on payoffs. Here, we extend this theory of “zero-
determinant” (or, more generally, “autocratic”) strategies to alternating games, which are often biologically
more relevant than traditional synchronous games. Alternating games naturally result in asymmetries
between players because the first move matters or because players might not move with equal probabilities.
In a strictly-alternating game with two players, X and Y , we give conditions for the existence of autocratic
strategies for player X when (i) X moves first and (ii) Y moves first. Furthermore, we show that autocratic
strategies exist even for (iii) games with randomly-alternating moves. Particularly important categories
of autocratic strategies are extortionate and generous strategies, which enforce unfavorable and favorable
outcomes for the opponent, respectively. We illustrate these strategies using the continuous Donation Game,
in which a player pays a cost to provide a benefit to the opponent according to a continuous cooperative
investment level. Asymmetries due to alternating moves could easily arise from dominance hierarchies, and
we show that they can endow subordinate players with more autocratic strategies than dominant players.
1. Introduction
Repeated games, and, in particular, the repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma, have been used extensively to
study the reciprocation of cooperative behaviors in social dilemmas [3, 4, 28, 37]. These games traditionally
involve a sequence of interactions in which two players act simultaneously (or, at least without knowing the
opponent’s move) and condition their decisions on the history of their previous encounters. Even though such
synchronized decisions seem often contrived in realistic social interactions, the biologically more realistic and
relevant scenario with asynchronous interactions has received surprisingly little attention. In asynchronous
games, players take turns and alternate moves in either a strict or random fashion [29, 42].
A classic example of an asynchronous game with alternating moves is blood donation in vampire bats [44].
When a well-fed bat donates blood to a hungry fellow, the recipient has the opportunity to return the favor
at a later time. Similarly, social grooming between two primates is not always performed simultaneously;
instead, one animal grooms another, who then has the opportunity to reciprocate in the future [24]. On
a smaller scale, the biosynthesis of iron-scavenging compounds by microorganisms through quorum sensing
can result in asynchronous responses to fellow “players” in the population [15, 23, 36]. Even for interactions
that appear to involve simultaneous decisions, such as in acts of predator inspection by fish [21], it remains
difficult to rule out that these interactions are not instead based on rapid, non-synchronous decisions [8].
The iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma game, which involves a choice to either cooperate, C, or defect, D, in
each round, has played a central role in the study of reciprocal altruism [3, 4, 28]. Rather unexpectedly,
after decades of intense study of iterated games, Press and Dyson [30] showed that a player can unilaterally
enforce linear payoff relationships in synchronous games. For example, if piX and piY are the expected payoffs
to players X and Y , respectively, and χ ě 1 is an extortion factor, then player X can ensure that piX “ χpiY ,
regardless of the strategy of player Y . Moreover, such linear relationships may be enforced using merely
memory-one strategies, which condition the next move on the outcome of just the previous round.
The discovery of these so-called “zero-determinant” strategies triggered a flurry of follow-up studies. Most
notably, from an evolutionary perspective, extortionate strategies fare poorly [12] but can be stable provided
that extortioners recognize one another [1]. However, generous counterparts of extortionate strategies per-
form much better in evolving populations [33, 34] and constitute Nash equilibria for the repeated Prisoner’s
Dilemma [14] (but generally only if there are just two discrete levels of cooperation [19]). Against humans,
extortionate strategies typically underperform generous strategies when the extortioner is also a human [13]
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(a) player X C D D
player Y D C C
round 0 1 2 3 4 5 ¨ ¨ ¨
Ó Ó Ó Ó Ó Ó
pX’s payoff, Y ’s payoffq p´c, bq p0, 0q p0, 0q pb,´cq p0, 0q pb,´cq
(b) player X C D D
player Y D C C
round 0 1 2 3 4 5 ¨ ¨ ¨
Ó Ó Ó Ó Ó Ó
pX’s payoff, Y ’s payoffq p0, 0q p´c, bq pb,´cq p0, 0q pb,´cq p0, 0q
(c) player X C D D C
player Y D C
round 0 1 2 3 4 5 ¨ ¨ ¨
Ó Ó Ó Ó Ó Ó
pX’s payoff, Y ’s payoffq p´c, bq p0, 0q p0, 0q p0, 0q p´c, bq pb,´cq
Figure 1. Three types of interactions in the alternating Donation Game: (A) strictly-
alternating game in which player X moves first; (B) strictly-alternating game in which
player Y moves first; and (C) randomly-alternating game in which, in each round, player
X moves with probability ωX and player Y with probability 1 ´ ωX . For each type of
alternating game, a player moves either C or D (cooperate or defect) in each round and
both players receive a payoff from this move. Unlike in strictly-alternating games, (A) and
(B), a player might move several times in a row in a randomly-alternating game, (C).
but can outperform generous strategies when the extortioner is a computer [41]. Thus, for the settings in
which zero-determinant strategies are known to exist, their performance is sensitive to the context in which
they arise. Our focus here is on extending these strategies further into the domain of alternating interactions
from a classical, non-evolutionary viewpoint. In particular, we establish the existence of zero-determinant
strategies for several types of alternating interactions between two players.
Recently, autocratic strategies were introduced as a generalization of zero-determinant strategies to si-
multaneous games with arbitrary action spaces [19]. An autocratic strategy for player X is any strategy
that, for some constants α, β, and γ (not all zero), enforces the linear relationship
αpiX ` βpiY ` γ “ 0 (1)
on expected payoffs every strategy of player Y . Here, we consider autocratic strategies in alternating games.
In a strictly-alternating game, one player moves first (either X or Y ) and waits for the opponent’s response
before moving again. This process then repeats, with each player moving only after the opponent moved
(see Fig. 1(A),(B)). In contrast, in a randomly-alternating game, the player who moves in each round is
chosen stochastically: at each time step, X moves with probability ωX and Y moves with probability 1´ωX
for some 0 ď ωX ď 1 (see Fig. 1(C)). Note that only for ωX “ 1{2 is it the case that both players move, on
average, equally often.
Previous studies of zero-determinant strategies have focused on enforcing linear payoff relationships us-
ing conditional responses with short memories. A player using a memory-one strategy determines his or
her response (stochastically) based on the outcome of just the previous round. Although strategies with
longer memory length have been shown to help establish cooperation [10, 35], they are not always reliably
implemented in players with limited memory capacity (including humans) [5, 22, 32]. Here, we follow the
tradition of concentrating on shorter-memory strategies. In particular, we establish the existence of memory-
one autocratic strategies for alternating games and give several simple examples that enforce linear payoff
relationships for every strategy of the opponent (even those with unlimited memory).
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In the classical Donation Game [31], a player either (i) cooperates and donates b to the opponent at a
cost of c or (ii) defects and donates nothing and pays no cost, which yields the payoff matrix
˜ C D
C b´ c ´c
D b 0
¸
(2)
and represents an instance of the Prisoner’s Dilemma provided that benefits exceed the costs, b ą c ą 0. The
continuous Donation Game extends this binary action space and allows for a continuous range of cooperation
levels [16, 17, 39, 40]. An action in this game is an investment level, s, taken from an interval, r0,Ks, where
K indicates an upper bound on investments. Based on its investment level, s, a player then pays a cost
of c psq to donate b psq to the opponent where bpsq and cpsq are continuous non-decreasing functions with
bpsq ą cpsq ą 0 for s ą 0 and bp0q “ cp0q “ 0; an investment of zero corresponds to defection, which neither
generates benefits nor incurs costs [16]. Biologically-relevant interpretations of continuous investment levels
(as well as alternating moves) include (i) the effort expended in social grooming and ectoparasite removal
by primates [6]; (ii) the quantity of blood donated by one vampire bat to another [44]; (iii) the amount
of iron-binding agents (siderophores) produced by bacterial parasites [43]; and (iv) the honesty level of a
(human) party involved in a trade agreement [38].
In alternating games, the assignment of payoffs to players deserves closer inspection [11]. Here, we focus
on alternating games in which both players obtain payoffs after every move (like in the continuous Donation
Game) [see Fig. 1; 29]. Alternatively, payoffs could result from every pair of moves rather than every
individual move [8]. While it is possible to construct a theory of autocratic strategies for strictly-alternating
games in either setting, it becomes difficult to even define payoffs in the latter setup for randomly-alternating
games because either player can move several times in a row (see Fig. 1(C)). Therefore, we follow Nowak
and Sigmund [29] in order to include the particularly relevant and intriguing case of randomly-alternating
games.
Randomly-alternating games seem more relevant for modeling biological interactions because often strict
alternation cannot be maintained or enforced, or the players find themselves in different roles, which translate
into different propensities to move. To accommodate these situations, we consider a class of randomly-
alternating games in which the probability that player X moves in a given round, ωX , is not necessarily
1{2. Any other value of ωX results in asymmetric interactions – even if the payoffs in each encounter are
symmetric – simply because one player moves more often than the other. For example, dominance hierarchies
in primates naturally result in asymmetric behavioral patterns [18, 20, 26]. In male chimpanzees, dominance
hierarchies require smaller, subordinate chimpanzees to groom larger, dominant chimpanzees more often
than vice versa [7]. Therefore, including such asymmetries significantly expands the scope of interactions to
which the theory of autocratic strategies applies.
2. Existence of autocratic strategies
In every round of an alternating game, either player X or player Y moves. On player X’s turn, she chooses
an action, x, from an action space, SX , and gets a payoff fX pxq while her opponent gets fY pxq. Similarly,
when player Y moves, he chooses an action, y, from SY and gets a payoff gY pyq while his opponent gets
gX pyq. Future payoffs are discounted by a factor λ (with 0 ă λ ă 1), which can represent a time preference
[9] that is derived, for example, from interest rates for monetary payoffs. Alternatively, λ can be interpreted
as the probability that there will be another round, which results in a finitely-repeated game with an average
length of 1{p1´ λq rounds [28].
2.1. Strictly-alternating games. In a pair of rounds in which player X moves before Y , the payoffs are
uX px, yq :“ fX pxq ` λgX pyq and uY px, yq :“ fY pxq ` λgY pyq, respectively. Note that the payoffs from Y ’s
move are discounted by a factor of λ because Y moves one round after X. The payoff functions, uX and
uY , satisfy the “equal gains from switching” property [27], which means the difference between uX px, yq and
uX px1, yq is independent of the opponent’s move, y. This property follows immediately from the fact that
uX (or uY ) is obtained by adding the separate contributions based on the moves of X and Y .
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Figure 2. Three examples of memory-one strategies for player X in a strictly-alternating
game whose action spaces are SX “ SY “ r0,Ks for some K ą 0. (A) depicts a reactive
stochastic strategy in which solely Y ’s last move is used to determine the probability distri-
bution with which X chooses her next action. The mean of this distribution is an increasing
function of y, which means that X is more likely to invest more (play closer to K) as y
increases. (B) illustrates a reactive two-point strategy, i.e. a strategy that plays only two
actions, 0 (defect) or K (fully cooperate). Player Y ’s last move is used to determine the
probability with which X plays K in the next round; if X does not use K, then she uses
0. As Y ’s last action, y, increases, X is more likely to reciprocate and use K in response.
(C) shows a strategy that gives X’s next move deterministically as a function of both of the
players’ last moves. Unlike in (A) and (B), X’s next move is uniquely determined by her own
last move, x, and the last move of her opponent, y. If Y used y “ 0 in the previous round,
then X responds by playing 0 as well. X’s subsequent action is then an increasing function
of y whose rate of change is largest when X’s last move, x, is smallest. In particular, if Y
used y ą 0 in the previous round, then X’s next action is a decreasing function of her last
move, x. Therefore, in (C), X exploits players who are unconditional cooperators.
Thus, if player X moves first and px0, y1, x2, y3, . . . q is the sequence of play, then her average payoff is
piX “ p1´ λq
« 8ÿ
t“0
λ2tfX px2tq `
8ÿ
t“0
λ2t`1gX py2t`1q
ff
“ p1´ λq
8ÿ
t“0
λ2tuX px2t, y2t`1q . (3)
The second expression resembles the average payoff for a simultaneous-move game whose one-shot payoff
function is uX [9]. Similarly, replacing uX with uY yields player Y ’s average payoff, piY .
For strictly-alternating games, we borrow the term “memory-one strategy” from synchronous games to
mean a conditional response based on the previous moves of both players. Even though this memory now
covers two rounds of interactions, it remains meaningful because player Y always moves after player X (or
vice versa). For an arbitrary action space, SX , a memory-one strategy for player X formally consists of
an initial action, σ0X , and a memory-one action, σX rx, ys, which are both probability distributions on SX .
Since player X moves first, she bases her initial action on σ0X and subsequently uses the two previous moves,
x and y, to choose an action in the next round using σX rx, ys (see Fig. 2 for graphical depictions).
Theorem 1 (Autocratic strategies for strictly-alternating games in which X moves first). Suppose that´
αfX pxq ` βfY pxq ` γ
¯
` λ
´
αgX pyq ` βgY pyq ` γ
¯
“ ψ pxq ´ λ2
ż
sPSX
ψ psq dσX rx, ys psq ´
`
1´ λ2˘ ż
sPSX
ψ psq dσ0X psq (4)
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holds for some bounded ψ and for each x P SX and y P SY . Then, if player X moves first, the pair`
σ0X , σX rx, ys
˘
allows X to enforce the equation αpiX ` βpiY ` γ “ 0 for every strategy of player Y .
A proof of this result may be found in Supporting Information.
Note that the average payoff, piX , of Eq. (3) is the same as in a simultaneous-move game whose payoff
function is 11`λuX and whose discounting factor is λ
2 [19]. Hence, it is not so surprising that autocratic
strategies exist in this case too (and under similar conditions). However, the situation changes if Y moves
first and py0, x1, y2, x3, . . . q is the sequence of play. In this case, X’s average payoff is
piX “ p1´ λq
«
gX py0q ` λ
8ÿ
t“0
λ2tuX px2t`1, y2t`2q
ff
. (5)
When Y moves first, player X’s initial move, σ0X ry0s, is now a function of Y ’s first move, y0. However, X’s
lack of control over the first round does not (in general) preclude the existence of autocratic strategies:
Theorem 2 (Autocratic strategies for strictly-alternating games in which Y moves first). Suppose that´
αfX pxq ` βfY pxq ` γ
¯
` λ
´
αgX pyq ` βgY pyq ` γ
¯
`
ˆ
1´ λ2
λ
˙´
αgX py0q ` βgY py0q ` γ
¯
“ ψ pxq ´ λ2
ż
sPSX
ψ psq dσX rx, ys psq ´
`
1´ λ2˘ ż
sPSX
ψ psq dσ0X ry0s psq (6)
holds for some bounded ψ and for each x P SX and y0, y P SY . Then, if player X moves second, the pair`
σ0X ry0s , σX rx, ys
˘
allows X to enforce the equation αpiX ` βpiY ` γ “ 0 for every strategy of player Y .
For a proof of this statement, see Supporting Information.
Note that Eq. (6) is slightly more restrictive than Eq. (4) because player X has no control over the
outcome of the initial round. Evidently, for undiscounted (infinite) games (λ “ 1), it is irrelevant who moves
first and hence the conditions for the existence of autocratic strategies coincide (c.f. Eqs. (4) and (6)).
2.2. Randomly-alternating games. In a randomly-alternating game, the player who moves in any given
round is determined probabilistically: player X moves with probability ωX and player Y with probability
1 ´ ωX . Suppose that X and Y each make plans to play xt and yt at time t, respectively, assuming they
move at time t. Then, in the repeated game, these strategies give player X an average payoff of
piX “ p1´ λq
8ÿ
t“0
λt
´
ωXfX pxtq ` p1´ ωXq gX pytq
¯
. (7)
Y ’s average payoff, piY , is obtained from Eq. (7) by replacing fX and gX by fY and gY , respectively.
For randomly-alternating games, we need to reconsider the concept of memory-one strategies. If moves
alternate randomly, then a logical extension is provided by a conditional response based on the previous
move as well as on which player moved. In particular, σYX rys denotes a mixed action for player X after
player Y uses y in the previous round, and σXX rxs denotes a mixed action after playing x herself. Note
that the cognitive requirement in terms of memory capacity in strictly-alternating games remains the same
as for simultaneous games, whereas for randomly-alternating games the requirements are significantly less
demanding as reflected in two univariate response functions as compared to response functions involving two
variables. For two-action games (such as the classical Donation Game), however, memory-one strategies for
synchronous, strictly-alternating, and randomly-alternating games all reduce to four-tuples of probabilities
(see §3 below).
Rather surprisingly, randomly-alternating games also admit autocratic strategies:
Theorem 3 (Autocratic strategies for randomly-alternating games). If, for some bounded ψ,
αfX pxq ` βfY pxq ` γ “ ψ pxq ´ λωX
ż
sPSX
ψ psq dσXX rxs psq ´ p1´ λqωX
ż
sPSX
ψ psq dσ0X psq ; (8a)
αgX pyq ` βgY pyq ` γ “ ´λωX
ż
sPSX
ψ psq σYX rys psq ´ p1´ λqωX
ż
sPSX
ψ psq dσ0X psq (8b)
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for each x P SX and y P SY , then the strategy
`
σ0X , σ
X
X rxs , σYX rys
˘
allows X to enforce the equation
αpiX ` βpiY ` γ “ 0 for every strategy of player Y .
For a proof of this result, we refer the reader to Supporting Information.
However, through examples we demonstrate in §3 and §4 that autocratic strategies do require that player
X moves sufficiently often, i.e. condition Eq. (8) implicitly puts a lower bound on ωX .
Remark. Theorems 1, 2, and 3 give conditions under which X can enforce αpiX ` βpiY ` γ “ 0 for every
strategy of player Y . Although X is using a memory-one strategy to enforce this linear relationship, we make
no assumptions on Y ’s strategy; it can be any behavioral strategy with arbitrary (even infinite) memory. For
two-action (and undiscounted) games with simultaneous moves, Press and Dyson [30] show that if X uses a
memory-one strategy, then the strategy of Y may also be assumed to be memory-one. While this result is
required for the use of their “determinant trick” to establish the existence of zero-determinant strategies, it
is not needed here due to a technique of Akin [2]. Further details are in Supporting Information.
3. Example: classical Donation Game
While our main results hold for alternating games with generic action spaces, we first illustrate their
implications for the classical, two-action Donation Game. The classical Donation Game, whose payoff matrix
is given by Eq. (2), is based on the discrete actions of cooperate, C, and defect, D. Without discounting,
initial moves do not matter and hence a memory-one strategy for player X is defined by a four-tuple,
p :“ ppCC , pCD, pDC , pDDq, where pxy is the probability that X cooperates after X plays x and Y plays y
for x, y P tC,Du. In the simultaneous-move Donation Game, Press and Dyson [30] show that for χ ě 1,
p “ p1´ φ pχ´ 1q pb´ cq , 1´ φ pχb` cq , φ pb` χcq , 0q (9)
unilaterally enforces the extortionate relationship piX “ χpiY provided that a normalization factor, φ, exists.
In undiscounted (infinite) and strictly-alternating games, we know from Eqs. (4) and (6) that player X
does not need to take into account who moves first when devising an autocratic strategy and, moreover, the
conditions become identical to those for simultaneous games [19, 30]. Therefore, player X can use a single
strategy to enforce piX “ χpiY in both simultaneous and strictly-alternating games. For discounted (finite)
games, however, autocratic strategies depend on whether the moves are simultaneous or strictly-alternating,
but the condition on the discounting factor guaranteeing their existence, λ ě pb` χcq { pχb` cq, does not.
In the undiscounted but randomly-alternating Donation Game, player X moves with probability ωX
and player Y with probability 1 ´ ωX in each round. A memory-one strategy for player X is given by
pX “ `pXC , pXD˘ and pY “ `pYC , pYD˘, where pXx (resp. pYy ) denotes the probability that X plays C if X moved
x (resp. Y moved y) in the preceding round. In this game, player X can enforce piX “ χpiY with
pX “
ˆ
1
ωX
p1´ φ pχb` cqq , 0
˙
, pY “
ˆ
1
ωX
φ pb` χcq , 0
˙
(10)
provided that the normalization factor, φ, falls within the range
1´ ωX
χb` c ď φ ď min
"
ωX
b` χc,
1
χb` c
*
. (11)
The existence of such a φ in this range requires that X moves sufficiently frequently, i.e.
ωX ě b` χcpχ` 1q pb` cq . (12)
Otherwise, player X loses control over the outcome of the game and can no longer enforce a linear payoff
relationship. The autocratic strategy defined by Eq. (10) is unforgiving and always responds to defection with
defection but more readily cooperates than its counterpart for simultaneous or strictly-alternating Donation
Games, defined by Eq. (9), since pXC “ 1ωX pCD ě pCD and pYC “ 1ωX pDC ě pDC .
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4. Example: continuous Donation Game
In the continuous Donation Game, the action space available to players X and Y is an interval r0,Ks,
which indicates a continuous range of cooperative investment levels with an upper bound K ą 0. If X
plays x P r0,Ks, she donates bpxq to her opponent at a cost cpxq to herself with bpxq ą cpxq for x ą 0 and
bp0q “ cp0q “ 0 [16]. This game is symmetric with fX psq “ gY psq “ ´c psq and fY psq “ gX psq “ b psq.
4.1. Extortionate, generous, and equalizer strategies. For each variant of alternating moves, we con-
sider three particularly important classes of autocratic strategies for the continuous Donation Game: equal-
izer, extortionate, and generous. An equalizer strategy is an autocratic strategy that allows X to unilaterally
set either piX “ γ (self-equalizing) or piY “ γ (opponent-equalizing) [12]. In all scenarios, we show that no
self-equalizing strategies exist that allow player X to set piX “ γ for γ ą 0. However, player X can typ-
ically set the score of her opponent. Equalizer strategies are defined in the same way for alternating and
simultaneous-move games, whereas extortionate and generous strategies require slightly different definitions.
In the simultaneous version of the continuous Donation Game, player X can enforce the linear relationship
piX ´κ “ χ ppiY ´ κq for any χ ě 1 and 0 ď κ ď b pKq´ c pKq, provided λ is sufficiently close to 1 [19]. Note
that the “baseline payoff,” κ, indicates the payoff of an autocratic strategy against itself [13]. If χ ą 1 and
κ “ 0, then such an autocratic strategy is called “extortionate” since it ensures that the expected payoff of
player X is at least that of player Y . Conversely, if κ “ b pKq´ c pKq, then this strategy is called “generous”
(or “compliant”) since it ensures that the expected payoff of player X is at most that of player Y [12, 34].
The bounds on κ arise from the payoffs for mutual cooperation and mutual defection in repeated games.
Of course, in the simultaneous-move game, those bounds are the same as the payoffs for mutual cooperation
and defection in one-shot interactions. Discounted (finite), alternating games, on the other hand, result
in asymmetric payoffs even if the underlying one-shot interaction is symmetric. For example, if player X
moves first in the strictly-alternating, continuous Donation Game, and if both players are unconditional
cooperators, then piX “ pλb pKq ´ c pKqq { p1` λq but piY “ pb pKq ´ λc pKqq { p1` λq, which are not equal
for discounting factors λ ă 1. Thus, rather than comparing both piX and piY to the same payoff, κ, it makes
more sense to compare piX to κX and piY to κY for some κX and κY . Therefore, we focus on conditions
that allow player X to enforce piX ´ κX “ χ ppiY ´ κY q for κX and κY within a suitable range. Note that if
player X enforces this payoff relation and, conversely, player Y enforces piY ´ κY “ χ ppiX ´ κXq for some
χ ą 1, then player X gets κX and Y gets κY , which preserves the original interpretation of κ as the “baseline
payoff” [13]. Also note that the two strategies enforcing the respective payoff relation need not be the same
due to the asymmetry in payoffs, which arises from the asymmetry induced by alternating moves.
For s, s1 P t0,Ku, let κss1X and κss1Y be the baseline payoffs to players X and Y , respectively, when X uses
s unconditionally and Y uses s1 unconditionally in the repeated game. For sufficiently weak discounting
factors, λ, player X can enforce piX ´ κX “ χ ppiY ´ κY q for any alternating game if and only if
κX “ κX `
`
χκ00Y ´ κ00X
˘ ď χκY ď κX ` `χκKKY ´ κKKX ˘ , (13)
where κ00X “ κ00Y “ 0. Eq. (13) implies that if player X attempts to minimize player Y ’s baseline payoff, κY ,
for a fixed κX , then χκY “ κX . Hence player X enforces piX´κX “ χ ppiY ´ κY q “ χpiY ´κX , or piX “ χpiY .
Such an autocratic strategy is called “extortionate” since it minimizes the baseline payoff of the opponent,
or, equivalently, it minimizes the difference χκY ´κX . Conversely, if player X tries to maximize Y ’s baseline
payoff, then χκY “ κX `
`
χκKKY ´ κKKX
˘
and X enforces the equation piX ´ κKKX “ χ
`
piY ´ κKKY
˘
. This
type of autocratic strategy is called “generous” since it maximizes the baseline payoff of the opponent,
or, equivalently, it maximizes the difference χκY ´ κX . Therefore, qualitatively speaking, in spite of the
more detailed considerations necessary for alternating games, the introduction of distinct baseline payoffs
for players X and Y does not affect the spirit in which extortionate and generous strategies are defined.
Interestingly, and somewhat surprisingly, it is possible for player X to devise an autocratic strategy based
on merely two distinct actions, s1 and s2, despite the fact that her opponent may draw on a continuum of
actions [19]. In strictly-alternating games, such a “two-point” strategy adjusts p px, yq (resp. 1 ´ p px, yq),
the probability of playing s1 (resp. s2), in response to the previous moves, x and y, while the actions s1 and
s2 themselves remain unchanged. These strategies are particularly illustrative because they admit analyt-
ical solutions and simpler intuitive interpretations. In the following we focus first on two-point autocratic
strategies for player X based on the two actions of full cooperation, K, and defection, 0. For each variant of
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alternating game, we derive stochastic two-point strategies enforcing extortionate, generous, and equalizer
payoff relationships. For the more interesting case of randomly-alternating moves, we also give deterministic
analogues of these strategies that use infinitely many points in the action space.
4.2. Strictly-alternating moves; player X moves first. The baseline payoffs for full, mutual cooperation
if player X moves first are
κKKX “ λb pKq ´ c pKq1` λ ; κ
KK
Y “ b pKq ´ λc pKq1` λ , (14)
while the baseline payoffs for mutual defection are always κ00X “ κ00Y “ 0. The function ψ psq :“ ´χb psq´c psq
conveniently eliminates x from Eq. (4). For sufficiently long interactions or weak discounting factors, i.e.
λ ě b pKq ` χc pKq
χb pKq ` c pKq , (15)
the two-point strategy defined by
p pyq “ λ pb pyq ` χc pyqq ` p1` λq pχκY ´ κXq
λ2 pχb pKq ` c pKqq ´
1´ λ2
λ2
p0, (16)
allows player X to unilaterally enforce piX´κX “ χ ppiY ´ κY q as long as p0 falls within a suitable range (see
Eq. (SI.50)) and κX ď χκY ď κX `
`
χκKKY ´ κKKX
˘
. Whether the autocratic strategy defined by pp0, p pyqq
is extortionate or generous depends on the choice of χ, κX , and κY . Note that p pyq does not depend on
player X’s own previous move, x, and hence represents an instance of a reactive strategy [27].
Similarly, choosing ψpsq :“ b psq again eliminates x from Eq. (4) but now enables player X to adopt an
equalizer strategy and set her opponent’s score to piY “ γ with 0 ď γ ď pb pKq ´ λc pKqq { p1` λq by using
p pyq “ λc pyq ` p1` λq γ
λ2b pKq ´
1´ λ2
λ2
p0, (17)
provided the initial probability of cooperation, p0, falls within a feasible range (see Eq. (SI.52)). However,
just like in the simultaneous-move game, player X can never set her own score [see 19].
4.3. Strictly-alternating moves; player Y moves first. The baseline payoffs for full cooperation if
player Y moves first are
κKKX “ b pKq ´ λc pKq1` λ ; κ
KK
Y “ λb pKq ´ c pKq1` λ , (18)
and, again, the baseline payoffs for mutual defection are both 0. The scaling function ψ psq :“ ´χb psq ´
c psq ` χκY ´ κX eliminates x from Eq. (6). For sufficiently weak discounting, i.e. if Eq. (15) holds, the
autocratic, reactive strategy, that cooperates (plays K) with probability
p pyq “ b pyq ` χc pyq ` p1` λq pχκY ´ κXq
λ pχb pKq ` c pKqq (19)
after player Y moved y, then enables player X to unilaterally enforce piX ´ κX “ χ ppiY ´ κY q whenever
κX ď χκY ď κX`
`
χκKKY ´ κKKX
˘
. Again, whether p pyq translates into an extortionate or generous strategy
depends on χ, κX , and κY . Note that the first move of X depends on simply her opponent’s initial move
and hence does not need to be specified separately.
Similarly, setting ψ psq :“ b psq ´ γ also eliminates x from Eq. (6) but enables player X to enforce piY “ γ
with 0 ď γ ď pλb pKq ´ c pKqq { p1` λq, which implicitly requires λ ě c pKq {b pKq. This equalizer strategy
plays K with probability
p pyq “ c pyq ` p1` λq γ
λb pKq (20)
after player Y played y. Although player X can set the score of player Y , she cannot set her own score.
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Figure 3. Feasible payoff pairs, ppiY , piXq, when X uses a two-point strategy (hatched) and
when X uses the entire action space (light blue). The benefit function is b psq “ 5 `1´ e´2s˘,
the cost function is c psq “ 2s, and the action spaces are SX “ SY “ r0, 2s [see 16]. The
probability that player X moves in any given round is (A) ωX “ 1{3, (B) ωX “ 1{2, and
(C) ωX “ 2{3. In each figure, the payoffs for mutual defection (0) are indicated by a red
point and for mutual full-cooperation (K “ 2) by a green point. The blue point marks the
payoffs when X defects and Y fully cooperates, and the magenta point vice versa. From (A)
and (C), we see that if ωX ‰ 1{2, then the payoffs for the alternating game are typically
asymmetric even though the one-shot game is symmetric.
4.4. Randomly-alternating moves. In randomly-alternating games, the average payoffs, piX and piY , for
players X and Y , respectively, depend on the probability ωX with which player X moves in any given round;
see Eq. (7). The region spanned by feasible payoff pairs, ppiY , piXq, not only depends on ωX but also on
the class of strategies considered; see Fig. 3. In particular, the two-point strategies based on the extreme
actions, 0 and K, cover only a portion of the payoff region spanned by strategies utilizing the full action
space, r0,Ks. We use both two-point and deterministic autocratic strategies for illustrations as they are
among the more straightforward ways in which to enforce linear payoff relationships.
4.4.1. Two-point autocratic strategies. Here, we focus on these two-point autocratic strategies for player X,
which are concentrated on the two points 0 and K and are defined by (i) the probability that X uses K in
the first round, p0; (ii) the probability that X uses K following her own move in which she used x, p
X pxq;
and (iii) the probability that X uses K following her opponent’s move in which he used y, pY pyq.
For randomly-alternating moves, the baseline payoffs for full cooperation are
κKKX “ p1´ ωXq b pKq ´ ωXc pKq ; κKKY “ ωXb pKq ´ p1´ ωXq c pKq , (21)
while those for mutual defection remain both 0. Suppose that discounting is sufficiently weak, or interactions
cover sufficiently many rounds, i.e.
λ ě 1
ωX
¨ b pKq ` χc pKqpχ` 1q pb pKq ` c pKqq , (22)
and that κX ď χκY ď κX `
`
χκKKY ´ κKKX
˘
. Then, the two-point autocratic strategy defined by
pX pxq “ b pxq ` χc pxq ` χκY ´ κX
λωX pχ` 1qpb pKq ` c pKqq ´
1´ λ
λ
p0; (23a)
pY pyq “ pX pyq (23b)
enables player X to unilaterally enforce piX ´ κX “ χ ppiY ´ κY q provided p0 falls within a suitable range
(see Eq. (SI.67)). The scaling function ψ psq :“ ´pχ` 1q pb psq ` c psqq was chosen such that X’s response
depends on the previous action but not on which player used it.
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Figure 4. Two-point extortionate, generous, and equalizer strategies for the randomly-
alternating, continuous Donation Game. In each panel, the red (resp. green) point indicates
the payoffs for mutual defection (resp. full cooperation). The blue point gives the payoffs
when X defects and Y fully cooperates in every round, and the magenta point vice versa. In
the top row, both players move with equal probability in a given round (ωX “ 1{2), whereas
in the bottom row player X moves twice as often as player Y (ωX “ 2{3). The extortionate
strategies in (A) and (D) enforce piX “ χpiY , while the generous strategies in (B) and (E)
enforce piX ´ κKKX “ χ
`
piY ´ κKKY
˘
with χ “ 2 (black) and χ “ 3 (blue). The equalizer
strategies in (C) and (F) enforce piY “ γ with γ “ κ00Y “ 0 (black) and γ “ κKKY (blue). The
simulation data in each panel show the average payoffs, ppiY , piXq, for player X’s two-point
strategy against 1000 random memory-one strategies for player Y . The benefit function is
b psq “ 5 `1´ e´2s˘ and the cost function is c psq “ 2s for action spaces SX “ SY “ r0, 2s.
If player X is at least as likely to move in each round as is player Y , i.e. ωX ě 1{2, then, for every χ ě 1,
a sufficiently weak discounting factor exists that satisfies Eq. (22) and λ ď 1 and hence enables player X to
enforce piX ´ κX “ χ ppiY ´ κY q. In particular, both extortionate and generous autocratic strategies exist
for the randomly-alternating, continuous Donation Game; see Fig. 4.
Similarly, an equalizing two-point strategy for player X can ensure piY “ γ for any
0 ď γ ď ωXb pKq ´ p1´ ωXq c pKq . (24)
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X can enforce such a relationship using the two-point strategy defined by
pX pxq “ c pxq ` γ
λωX pb pKq ` c pKqq ´
1´ λ
λ
p0; (25a)
pY pyq “ pX pyq (25b)
provided p0 falls within a specified range (see Eq. (SI.69)). Note that player X is unable to unilater-
ally set the payoff of player Y to anything below unconditional defection, 0, and beyond unconditional
cooperation, ωXb pKq ´ p1´ ωXq c pKq; see Supporting Information for further details. Moreover, it must
be true that λωXb pKq ě p1´ λωXq c pKq. For ωX “ 1{2, the discounting factor, λ, must therefore sat-
isfy λ ě 2c pKq { pb pKq ` c pKqq, which enables player X to set Y ’s score to anything between 0 and
pb pKq ´ c pKqq {2. In the limit where player X moves exclusively, ωX Ñ 1, player Y ’s score can be set
to at most b pKq, which, itself, is clear from the definition of the continuous Donation Game.
Although player X can unilaterally set Y ’s score, she cannot set her own score to anything above 0, and,
for ωX ď 1{2, she cannot set her own score to anything at all. For sufficiently large λωX , player X can
guarantee herself non-positive payoffs using an autocratic strategy; see Supporting Information. However,
strategies enforcing a return that is at most 0 may be of limited use since a player can always do at least as
well through unconditional defection. In contrast, in the simultaneous version of the continuous Donation
Game, player X can never set her own score [19]. This difference is not that surprising: even though player
X can exert control over randomly-alternating games for large ωX , the structure of the continuous Donation
Game precludes her from providing herself positive payoffs through actions of her own.
4.4.2. Deterministic autocratic strategies. Deterministic strategies, for which X reacts to the previous move
by playing an action with certainty (rather than probabilistically), cover a broader range of feasible payoffs
(see Fig. 3) than do two-point strategies [see also 19]. A simple example of a deterministic strategy is
tit-for-tat, which cooperates in the first round and subsequently copies the opponent’s previous move [3].
A deterministic strategy for a randomly-alternating game consists of (i) an initial action, x0; (ii) a reaction
function to one’s own move, rX : SX Ñ SX ; and (iii) a reaction function to the opponent’s move, rY :
SY Ñ SX . Here, we give examples of deterministic extortionate, generous, and equalizer strategies for the
continuous Donation Game. For example, player X can enforce piX ´ κX “ χ ppiY ´ κY q by using
rX pxq “ pb` cq´1
¨˝
b pxq ` χc pxq ` χκY ´ κX ´ p1´ λqωX pχ` 1q
´
b px0q ` c px0q
¯
λωX pχ` 1q
‚˛; (26a)
rY pyq “ rX pyq , (26b)
where pb` cq´1 p¨ ¨ ¨ q denotes the inverse of the function b psq`c psq, provided the initial action, x0, is chosen
appropriately. For instance, if κX “ κ00X “ 0 and κY “ κ00Y “ 0, then X may use x0 “ 0 to enforce the
extortionate relationship piX “ χpiY . If κX “ κKKX and κY “ κKKY , then X may use x0 “ K to enforce the
generous relationship piX ´ κKKX “ χ
`
piY ´ κKKY
˘
. In both cases, λ must satisfy Eq. (22) for rX and rY to
be well-defined reaction functions. Similarly, X can unilaterally equalize Y ’s payoff to piY “ γ by using
rX pxq “ pb` cq´1
ˆ
c pxq ` γ ´ p1´ λqωX pb px0q ` c px0qq
λωX
˙
; (27a)
rY pyq “ rX pyq . (27b)
If γ “ κ00Y “ 0, then player X may use x0 “ 0; if γ “ κKKY , then X may use x0 “ K. The feasible payoff
regions and simulation data for each of these classes of autocratic strategies are given in Fig. 5.
What is noteworthy about these strategies is that they require only the last move and not who played it.
In other words, a player using one of these strategies responds to a move by herself in exactly the same way
as she responds to a move by her opponent. Although a player never knows in advance when she will move
in a randomly-alternating game, she can still enforce extortionate, generous, and equalizer relationships on
payoffs by playing an action that is uniquely determined by the most recent action of the game.
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Figure 5. Deterministic extortionate, generous, and equalizer strategies for the randomly-
alternating, continuous Donation Game. In each round, both players have the same proba-
bility of moving (ωX “ 1{2). In (A), extortionate strategies enforce piX “ χpiY and in (B),
generous strategies enforce piX´κKKX “ χ
`
piY ´ κKKY
˘
with χ “ 2 (black) and χ “ 3 (blue).
In (C), equalizer strategies enforce piY “ γ with γ “ κ00Y “ 0 (black) and γ “ κKKY (blue).
Since deterministic strategies utilize a larger portion of the action space than two-point
strategies, the players can attain a broader range of payoff pairs, ppiY , piXq (c.f. Fig. 4).
The simulation data in each panel shows the average payoffs, ppiY , piXq, for X’s deterministic
strategy against 1000 randomly-chosen, memory-one strategies of the opponent. The benefit
function is b psq “ 5 `1´ e´2s˘ and the cost function is c psq “ 2s for s P r0, 2s.
5. Discussion
Repeated games likely rank among the best-studied topics in game theory, and the resulting insights have
been instrumental for our understanding of strategic behavioral patterns. For this reason, it came as all
the more of a surprise when Press and Dyson [30] reported a new class of “zero-determinant” strategies,
which enable players to exert unprecedented control in repeated interactions. However, notwithstanding
decades of extensive literature on repeated games, alternating interactions have received very little attention
when compared to their simultaneous counterparts. This emphasis is particularly puzzling because many,
if not most, social encounters among plants or animals (including humans) that unfold over several rounds
seem better captured by alternating actions of the interacting agents. Moreover, even within the realm
of alternating games, it is often assumed that individual turns alternate strictly rather than randomly
[8, 11, 25, 45].
Here, we introduce autocratic strategies, a generalization of zero-determinant strategies, for alternating
games. Due to similarities with simultaneous-move games, it is perhaps unsurprising that autocratic strate-
gies also exist for strictly-alternating games. However, even so, the continuous Donation Game demonstrates
that the autocratic strategies themselves depend on the timing of the players’ moves. What is more sur-
prising, and even unexpected, is the fact that autocratic strategies exist for randomly-alternating games as
well. This extension exemplifies the surprising robustness of autocratic strategies by relaxing the original
assumptions in three important ways: (i) to allow for discounted payoffs, i.e. to consider finite numbers of
rounds in each interaction [14]; (ii) to extend the action set from two distinct actions to infinite action spaces
[19]; and now (iii) to admit asynchronous decisions and, in particular, randomly-alternating ones. The latter
even includes asymmetric scenarios where one player moves, on average, more frequently than the other.
Under this far more generic setup we demonstrate that autocratic strategies still exist and enable players to
enforce extortionate, generous, and equalizer relationships with their opponent.
In the strictly-alternating, continuous Donation Game, autocratic strategies exist for player X provided
that the discounting factor, λ, is sufficiently weak, or, equivalently, that interactions span sufficiently many
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rounds; see Eq. (15). Interestingly, the condition on λ does not depend on whether player X moves first
or second and is even identical to the corresponding condition in the synchronous game [19]. In the ab-
sence of discounting, λ “ 1, the same strategy enforces, for instance, an extortionate payoff relationship in
simultaneous games as well as alternating games and regardless of whether or not player X moved first. We
demonstrate this phenomenon for the classical and continuous Donation Games in §3 and §4, respectively.
The condition for the existence of autocratic strategies in the randomly-alternating game, Eq. (22), is
similar to that of the strictly-alternating (and simultaneous) games, although slightly stronger. Not surpris-
ingly, this condition depends on the probability that player X moves in a given round, ωX . For each type
of alternating game, we give examples of simple two-point autocratic strategies in which player X’s actions
are restricted to 0 (defect) and K (fully cooperate). Although X can enforce any extortionate, generous, or
equalizer payoff relationship in the continuous Donation Game using a two-point strategy, a larger region of
feasible payoffs is attainable if X uses a deterministic autocratic strategy (see Fig. 3).
While autocratic strategies undoubtedly mark important behavioral patterns, their importance in an
evolutionary context is still debated: extortionate strategies perform poorly [1], whereas generous strategies
perform much better [34]. In fact, a generous strategy against itself represents a Nash equilibrium in the
simultaneous, two-action Prisoner’s Dilemma [14]. However, for extensions to continuous action spaces, such
as the continuous Donation Game, even a generous strategy with full mutual cooperation is not necessarily
a Nash equilibrium [19]. Similar considerations for alternating games are further nuanced because they
naturally introduce asymmetries in payoffs for the two players, even if the underlying interaction is symmetric
and both players follow the same strategy. In fact, this asymmetry holds for any strictly-alternating game
with discounting factor λ ă 1 because then it matters which player moved first. Similarly, in randomly-
alternating games, the payoffs typically depend on the probability ωX with which player X moves and hence
differ if ωX ‰ 1{2. Consequently, even if player X and Y adopt the same autocratic strategy, then player
X does not necessarily enforce the same linear relationship on payoffs as player Y , which complicates the
notion of equilibria both in the sense of Nash as well as rest points of the evolutionary dynamics.
Among alternating games, the randomly-alternating ones represent perhaps the most promising and rel-
evant setup from a biological perspective [see 29]. In the continuous Donation Game, autocratic strategies
exist even if the probability that playerX moves in a given round differs from that of player Y (i.e. ωX ‰ 1{2).
Of course, ωX must be large enough to ensure that player X is capable of exerting sufficient control over
the game to pursue an autocratic strategy. For ωX ą 1{2, this condition always holds in the continu-
ous Donation Game but might also apply under weaker conditions. Interestingly, such asymmetries easily
arise from dominance hierarchies. For example, in bouts of social grooming between primates [7], subordi-
nate individuals, X, typically groom dominant individuals, Y , more frequently than vice versa and hence
ωX ą 1{2. As a consequence, the subordinate player has more autocratic strategies available to impact social
grooming than does the dominant player. Thus, autocratic strategies can be particularly useful for exerting
control over asymmetric interactions. This observation marks not only an important distinction between
autocratic strategies for synchronous and alternating games but also promises interesting applications to
biologically-relevant interactions.
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Here, we prove our main results for each type of alternating game (strictly- and randomly-alternating
moves). By a measurable space, we mean a set, X, equipped with a σ-algebra of subsets, F pXq, although we
usually suppress F pXq. The notation ∆ pXq indicates the space of all probability measures on X, i.e. the set
of all measures, µ : F pXq Ñ r0,8q, with µ pXq “ 1. All functions are bounded and measurable.
SI.1. Strictly-alternating games
Let SX and SY be the action spaces available to players X and Y , respectively. We assume that these
spaces are measurable, but otherwise we impose no restrictions on them. Let fX pxq and fY pxq be the payoffs
to players X and Y , respectively, when X moves x P SX . Similarly, let gX pyq and gY pyq be the payoffs to
players X and Y , respectively, when Y moves y P SY . If λ is the discounting factor, then one may compress
a pair of rounds in which X moves first and Y moves second in order to form two-round payoff functions,
uX px, yq :“ fX pxq ` λgX pyq ; (SI.1a)
uY px, yq :“ fY pxq ` λgY pyq . (SI.1b)
In each of these two-round payoff functions, the payoff from player Y ’s move is discounted by a factor of λ
to account for the time difference or, equivalently, for the probability that the interaction ends before player
Y ’s turn.
Due to the differences in the expressions for the average payoffs when X moves first and when Y moves
first, respectively, we treat each of these cases separately in our study of autocratic strategies.
SI.1.1. X moves first. If player X moves first, then the entire sequence of play can be grouped into two-
round pairs in which X moves first and Y moves second. More specifically, if px0, y1, x2, y3, . . . q is the
sequence of play, then this sequence may be rewritten as ppx0, y1q , px2, y3q , . . . q. When written in this
manner, one may use uX to express the average payoff to player X for this sequence as
piX “ p1´ λq
« 8ÿ
t“0
λ2tfX px2tq `
8ÿ
t“0
λ2t`1gX py2t`1q
ff
“ p1´ λq
8ÿ
t“0
λ2t
´
fX px2tq ` λgX py2t`1q
¯
“ p1´ λq
8ÿ
t“0
λ2tuX px2t, y2t`1q . (SI.2)
Similarly, the average payoff to player Y is piY “ p1´ λqř8t“0 λ2tuY px2t, y2t`1q.
A time-T history indicates the sequence of play from time t “ 0 until (but not including) time t “ T and
is an element of HT :“śT´1t“0 HTt , where
HTt :“
#
SX t is even,
SY t is odd,
(SI.3)
for 0 ď t ď T ´ 1. For T “ 0, we let H0 :“ t∅u, where ∅ is the “empty history,” which indicates that the
game has not yet begun. A behavioral strategy defines a player’s actions (probabilistically) for any history of
play leading up to the current move [see 9]. That is, behavioral strategies for players X and Y , respectively,
may be written in terms of the space of histories as maps,
σX :
ğ
Tě0
H2T ÝÑ ∆ pSXq ; (SI.4a)
σY :
ğ
Tě0
H2T`1 ÝÑ ∆ pSY q , (SI.4b)
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where\ denotes the disjoint union operator, and ∆ pSXq and ∆ pSY q denote the space of probability measures
on SX and SY , respectively. These strategies may be written together more compactly as a map
σ : H :“
ğ
Tě0
HT ÝÑ ∆ pSXq \∆ pSY q
: hT ÞÝÑ
#
σX
“
hT
‰
T is even,
σY
“
hT
‰
T is odd.
(SI.5)
Using σ, we define a sequence of measures, tµtutě0, on Ht`1 as follows: For hT “
`
hT0 , h
T
1 , . . . , h
T
T´1
˘ P HT
and 0 ď t ď T ´ 1, let hTďt “
`
hT0 , h
T
1 , . . . , h
T
t
˘ P Ht`1. For E1 P F pHtq and E P F `Ht`1t ˘, let
µt
`
E1 ˆ E˘ :“ ż
htPE1
σ
`
ht, E
˘
dσ
`
htďt´2, htt´1
˘ ¨ ¨ ¨ dσ `htď0, ht1˘ dσ `∅, ht0˘ . (SI.6)
For 0 ď k ď t, let νkt be the measure on
śt
i“t´kH
i`1
i , which, for E P F
´śt
i“t´kH
i`1
i
¯
, is defined as
νkt pEq :“ µt
`
Ht´k ˆ E˘ . (SI.7)
In a p2T ` 2q-round game (rounds 0 through 2T ` 1), the expected payoff to player X is
pi2T`2X :“
ż
h2T`2PH2T`2
«ˆ
1´ λ
1´ λ2T`1
˙ Tÿ
t“0
λ2tuX
`
h2T`22t , h
2T`2
2t`1
˘ff
dσ
`
h2T`2ď2T , h
2T`2
2T`1
˘ ¨ ¨ ¨ dσ `h2T`2ď0 , h2T`21 ˘ dσ `∅, h2T`20 ˘
“
ˆ
1´ λ
1´ λ2T`1
˙ Tÿ
t“0
λ2t
ż
h2T`2PH2T`2
uX
`
h2T`22t , h
2T`2
2t`1
˘
dσ
`
h2T`2ď2T , h
2T`2
2T`1
˘ ¨ ¨ ¨ dσ `h2T`2ď0 , h2T`21 ˘ dσ `∅, h2T`20 ˘
“
ˆ
1´ λ
1´ λ2T`1
˙ Tÿ
t“0
λ2t
ż
h2t`2PH2t`2
uX
`
h2t`22t , h
2t`2
2t`1
˘
dσ
`
h2t`2ď2t , h
2t`2
2t`1
˘ ¨ ¨ ¨ dσ `h2t`2ď0 , h2t`21 ˘ dσ `∅, h2t`20 ˘
“
ˆ
1´ λ
1´ λ2T`1
˙ Tÿ
t“0
λ2t
ż
ph2t`22t ,h2t`22t`1qPH2t`22t ˆH2t`22t`1
uX
`
h2t`22t , h
2t`2
2t`1
˘
dν12t`1
`
h2t`22t , h
2t`2
2t`1
˘
“
ˆ
1´ λ
1´ λ2T`1
˙ Tÿ
t“0
λ2t
ż
px,yqPSXˆSY
uX px, yq dν12t`1 px, yq . (SI.8)
In particular, the limit
piX :“ lim
TÑ8pi
2T`2
X “ p1´ λq
8ÿ
t“0
λ2t
ż
px,yqPSXˆSY
uX px, yq dν12t`1 px, yq (SI.9)
exists since fX and gX (and hence uX) are bounded. Similarly, we define
piY :“ p1´ λq
8ÿ
t“0
λ2t
ż
px,yqPSXˆSY
uY px, yq dν12t`1 px, yq . (SI.10)
Our main technical lemma is an analogue of Lemma 3.1 of Akin [2]:
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Lemma 1. For any memory-one strategy, σX rx, ys, and any E P F pSXq,
8ÿ
t“0
λ2t
ż
px,yqPSXˆSY
”
χEˆSY px, yq ´ λ2σX rx, ys pEq
ı
dν12t`1 px, yq “ σ0X pEq , (SI.11)
where σ0X :“ σX r∅s is the initial action of player X.
Proof. By the definition of the measures
 
νkt
(0ďkďt
tě0 , we haveż
px,yqPSXˆSY
χEˆSY px, yq dν12t`1 px, yq “ ν02t pEq ; (SI.12a)
ż
px,yqPSXˆSY
σX rx, ys pEq dν12t`1 px, yq “ ν02t`2 pEq . (SI.12b)
Therefore, it follows that
8ÿ
t“0
λ2t
ż
px,yqPSXˆSY
”
χEˆSY px, yq ´ λ2σX rx, ys pEq
ı
dν12t`1 px, yq
“
8ÿ
t“0
λ2t
´
ν02t pEq ´ λ2ν02t`2 pEq
¯
“ ν00 pEq ´ lim
tÑ8λ
2t`2ν02t`2 pEq
“ ν00 pEq
“ σ0X pEq , (SI.13)
which completes the proof. 
Proposition 1. For any bounded, measurable function, ψ : SX Ñ R,
8ÿ
t“0
λ2t
ż
px,yqPSXˆSY
»–ψ pxq ´ λ2 ż
sPSX
ψ psq dσX rx, ys psq
fifl dν12t`1 px, yq “ ż
sPSX
ψ psq dσ0X psq . (SI.14)
Proof. The result follows from Lemma 1 and the dominated convergence theorem. We do not include the
details here; the argument is the same as the proof of Proposition 1 of [19]. 
Using Proposition 1, we now prove the first of our main results for strictly-alternating games:
Theorem 1 (Autocratic strategies for strictly-alternating games in which X moves first). Suppose that´
αfX pxq ` βfY pxq ` γ
¯
` λ
´
αgX pyq ` βgY pyq ` γ
¯
“ ψ pxq ´ λ2
ż
sPSX
ψ psq dσX rx, ys psq ´
`
1´ λ2˘ ż
sPSX
ψ psq dσ0X psq (SI.15)
holds for some bounded ψ and for each x P SX and y P SY . Then, if player X moves first, the pair`
σ0X , σX rx, ys
˘
allows X to enforce the equation αpiX ` βpiY ` γ “ 0 for every strategy of player Y .
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Proof. If Eq. (SI.15) holds, then, by Proposition 1 and Eqs. (SI.9) and (SI.10),
αpiX`βpiY ` γ ` p1´ λq
ż
sPSX
ψ psq dσ0X psq
“ p1´ λq
8ÿ
t“0
λ2t
ż
px,yqPSXˆSY
»–ψ pxq ´ λ2 ż
sPSX
ψ psq dσX rx, ys psq
fifl dν12t`1 px, yq
“ p1´ λq
ż
sPSX
ψ psq dσ0X psq , (SI.16)
and it follows that αpiX ` βpiY ` γ “ 0. 
SI.1.2. Y moves first. If Y moves first, then a sequence of moves, py0, x1, y2, x3, y4, . . . q, may be rewritten
as py0, px1, y2q , px3, y4q , . . . q, consisting of an initial move by Y followed by a sequence of two-round pairs in
which X moves first and Y moves second. The average payoff to player X for this sequence of play is then
piX “ p1´ λq
« 8ÿ
t“0
λ2t`1fX px2t`1q `
8ÿ
t“0
λ2tgX py2tq
ff
“ p1´ λq
«
gX py0q `
8ÿ
t“0
λ2t`1fX px2t`1q `
8ÿ
t“0
λ2t`2gX py2t`2q
ff
“ p1´ λq
«
gX py0q `
8ÿ
t“0
λ2t`1
´
fX px2t`1q ` λgX py2t`2q
¯ff
“ p1´ λq
«
gX py0q `
8ÿ
t“0
λ2t`1uX px2t`1, y2t`2q
ff
. (SI.17)
Similarly, player Y has an average payoff of piY “ p1´ λq
“
gY py0q `ř8t“0 λ2t`1uY px2t`1, y2t`2q‰.
The set of time-T histories is then given by HT :“śT´1t“0 HTt , where
HTt :“
#
SX t is odd,
SY t is even
(SI.18)
for 0 ď t ď T ´ 1, i.e. obtained from Eq. (SI.3) by swapping SX and SY . Similarly, behavioral strategies
for players X and Y , respectively, are defined as maps,
σX :
ğ
Tě0
H2T`1 ÝÑ ∆ pSXq ; (SI.19a)
σY :
ğ
Tě0
H2T ÝÑ ∆ pSY q , (SI.19b)
where, again, H0 :“ t∅u denotes the “empty” history. In this case, we define
σ : H :“
ğ
Tě0
HT ÝÑ ∆ pSXq \∆ pSY q
: hT ÞÝÑ
#
σX
“
hT
‰
T is odd,
σY
“
hT
‰
T is even.
(SI.20)
In terms of σ, the measures tµtutě0 and
 
νkt
(0ďkďt
tě0 are defined in the same way as they were in §SI.1.1.
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In a p2T ` 1q-round game (rounds 0 through 2T ), the expected payoff to player X is
pi2T`1X :“
ż
h2T`1PH2T`1
«ˆ
1´ λ
1´ λ2T
˙˜
gX
`
h2T`10
˘` T´1ÿ
t“0
λ2t`1uX
`
h2T`12t`1 , h
2T`1
2t`2
˘¸ff
dσ
`
h2T`1ď2T´1, h
2T`1
2T
˘ ¨ ¨ ¨ dσ `h2T`1ď0 , h2T`11 ˘ dσ `∅, h2T`10 ˘
“
ˆ
1´ λ
1´ λ2T
˙ ż
h2T`1PH2T`1
gX
`
h2T`10
˘
dσ
`
h2T`1ď2T´1, h
2T`1
2T
˘ ¨ ¨ ¨ dσ `h2T`1ď0 , h2T`11 ˘ dσ `∅, h2T`10 ˘
`
ˆ
1´ λ
1´ λ2T
˙ T´1ÿ
t“0
λ2t`1
ż
h2T`1PH2T`1
uX
`
h2T`12t`1 , h
2T`1
2t`2
˘
dσ
`
h2T`1ď2T´1, h
2T`1
2T
˘ ¨ ¨ ¨ dσ `h2T`1ď0 , h2T`11 ˘ dσ `∅, h2T`10 ˘
“
ˆ
1´ λ
1´ λ2T
˙ ż
h1PH1
gX
`
h10
˘
dσ
`
∅, h10
˘
`
ˆ
1´ λ
1´ λ2T
˙ T´1ÿ
t“0
λ2t`1
ż
ph2t`32t`1,h2t`32t`2qPH2t`32t`1ˆH2t`32t`2
uX
`
h2t`32t`1, h
2t`3
2t`2
˘
dν12t`2
`
h2t`32t`1, h
2t`3
2t`2
˘
“
ˆ
1´ λ
1´ λ2T
˙ ż
y0PSY
gX py0q dσ0Y py0q
`
ˆ
1´ λ
1´ λ2T
˙ T´1ÿ
t“0
λ2t`1
ż
px,yqPSXˆSY
uX px, yq dν12t`2 px, yq , (SI.21)
where σ0Y :“ σY r∅s is the initial action of player Y . Thus, we define player X’s average payoff as
piX :“ lim
TÑ8pi
2T`1
X
“ p1´ λq
»—– ż
y0PSY
gX py0q dσ0Y py0q `
8ÿ
t“0
λ2t`1
ż
px,yqPSXˆSY
uX px, yq dν12t`2 px, yq
fiffifl . (SI.22)
Similarly, the expected payoff to player Y is
piY :“ p1´ λq
»—– ż
y0PSY
gY py0q dσ0Y py0q `
8ÿ
t“0
λ2t`1
ż
px,yqPSXˆSY
uY px, yq dν12t`2 px, yq
fiffifl . (SI.23)
Once again, our main technical lemma is an analogue of Lemma 3.1 of Akin [2]:
Lemma 2. For any memory-one strategy, σX rx, ys, and any E P F pSXq,
8ÿ
t“0
λ2t`1
ż
px,yqPSXˆSY
”
χEˆSY px, yq ´ λ2σX rx, ys pEq
ı
dν12t`2 px, yq “ λ
ż
y0PSY
σX ry0s pEq dσ0Y py0q , (SI.24)
where σ0X ry0s is the initial action of player X.
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Proof. By the definition of
 
νkt
(0ďkďt
tě0 , we see thatż
px,yqPSXˆSY
χEˆSY px, yq dν12t`2 px, yq “ ν02t`1 pEq ; (SI.25a)
ż
px,yqPSXˆSY
σX rx, ys pEq dν12t`2 px, yq “ ν02t`3 pEq . (SI.25b)
Therefore, it follows that
8ÿ
t“0
λ2t`1
ż
px,yqPSXˆSY
”
χEˆSY px, yq ´ λ2σX rx, ys pEq
ı
dν12t`2 px, yq
“
8ÿ
t“0
λ2t`1
´
ν02t`1 pEq ´ λ2ν02t`3 pEq
¯
“ λν01 pEq ´ lim
tÑ8λ
2t`3ν02t`3 pEq
“ λν01 pEq
“ λ
ż
y0PSY
σX ry0s pEq dσ0Y py0q , (SI.26)
which completes the proof. 
Proposition 2. For any bounded, measurable function, ψ : SX Ñ R,
8ÿ
t“0
λ2t`1
ż
px,yqPSXˆSY
»–ψ pxq ´ λ2 ż
sPSX
ψ psq dσX rx, ys psq
fifl dν12t`2 px, yq
“ λ
ż
y0PSY
ż
sPSX
ψ psq dσ0X ry0s psq dσ0Y py0q . (SI.27)
Proof. The result follows from Lemma 2 and the dominated convergence theorem. We do not include the
details here; the argument is the same as the proof of Proposition 1 of [19]. 
We are now in a position to prove the second of our main results for strictly-alternating games:
Theorem 2 (Autocratic strategies for strictly-alternating games in which Y moves first). Suppose that´
αfX pxq ` βfY pxq ` γ
¯
` λ
´
αgX pyq ` βgY pyq ` γ
¯
`
ˆ
1´ λ2
λ
˙´
αgX py0q ` βgY py0q ` γ
¯
“ ψ pxq ´ λ2
ż
sPSX
ψ psq dσX rx, ys psq ´
`
1´ λ2˘ ż
sPSX
ψ psq dσ0X ry0s psq (SI.28)
holds for some bounded ψ and for each x P SX and y0, y P SY . Then, if player X moves second, the pair`
σ0X ry0s , σX rx, ys
˘
allows X to enforce the equation αpiX ` βpiY ` γ “ 0 for every strategy of player Y .
Proof. If Eq. (SI.28) holds, then, for any initial action of player Y , σ0Y , we have´
αfX pxq ` βfY pxq ` γ
¯
` λ
´
αgX pyq ` βgY pyq ` γ
¯
`
ˆ
1´ λ2
λ
˙ ż
y0PSY
”
αgX py0q ` βgY py0q ` γ
ı
dσ0Y py0q
“ ψ pxq ´ λ2
ż
sPSX
ψ psq dσX rx, ys psq ´
`
1´ λ2˘ ż
y0PSY
ż
sPSX
ψ psq dσ0X ry0s psq dσ0Y py0q . (SI.29)
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Therefore, by Proposition 2 and Eqs. (SI.22) and (SI.23), we see that, for each σ0Y ,
αpiX`βpiY ` γ ` p1´ λqλ
ż
y0PSY
ż
sPSX
ψ psq dσ0X ry0s psq dσ0Y py0q
´ p1´ λq
ż
y0PSY
”
αgX py0q ` βgY py0q ` γ
ı
dσ0Y py0q
“ p1´ λq
8ÿ
t“0
λ2t`1
ż
px,yqPSXˆSY
»–ψ pxq ´ λ2 ż
sPSX
ψ psq dσX rx, ys psq
fifl dν12t`2 px, yq
´ p1´ λq
8ÿ
t“0
λ2t`1
¨˝ˆ
1´ λ2
λ
˙ ż
y0PSY
”
αgX py0q ` βgY py0q ` γ
ı
dσ0Y py0q‚˛
“ p1´ λqλ
ż
y0PSY
ż
sPSX
ψ psq dσ0X ry0s psq dσ0Y py0q
´ p1´ λq
ż
y0PSY
”
αgX py0q ` βgY py0q ` γ
ı
dσ0Y py0q , (SI.30)
and it follows immediately that αpiX ` βpiY ` γ “ 0. 
SI.2. Randomly-alternating games
In each round of a randomly-alternating game, player X moves with probability ωX and player Y moves
with probability 1´ ωX for some 0 ď ωX ď 1. For T ě 1, a time-T history is an element of the space
HT :“ pSX \ SY qT , (SI.31)
where SX \ SY denotes the disjoint union of the action spaces of the players, SX and SY . As in §SI.1,
we let H0 :“ t∅u, where ∅ indicates the “empty history.” In terms of the space of all possible histories,
H :“ t∅u \ŮTě1HT , behavioral strategies for players X and Y , respectively, are maps,
σX : H ÝÑ ∆ pSXq ; (SI.32a)
σY : H ÝÑ ∆ pSY q . (SI.32b)
These strategies may be written more compactly as a single map, σ : HÑ ∆ pSX \ SY q, defined for hT P HT
and E P F pSX \ SY q via σ
“
hT
‰ pEq :“ ωXσX “hT ‰ pE X SXq ` p1´ ωXqσY “hT ‰ pE X SY q. Furthermore, if
HTt :“ SX \ SY for 0 ď t ď T ´ 1, then these two strategies, σX and σY , together generate a sequence of
probability measures,
 
ν0t
(
tě0, on H
t`1
t “ SX \ SY for each t, defined via Eqs. (SI.6) and (SI.7).
Consider the single-round payoff function for player X, uX : SX \ SY Ñ R, defined by
uX psq :“
#
fX psq s P SX ,
gX psq s P SY . (SI.33)
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The single-round payoff function for player Y , uY , is defined by replacing fX by fY and gX by gY in Eq.
(SI.33). In a pT ` 1q-round game (rounds 0 through T ), the expected payoff to player X is then
piT`1X :“
ż
hT`1PHT`1
«ˆ
1´ λ
1´ λT`1
˙ Tÿ
t“0
λtuX
`
hT`1t
˘ff
dσ
`
hT`1ďT´1, h
T`1
T
˘ ¨ ¨ ¨ dσ `hT`1ď0 , hT`11 ˘ dσ `∅, hT`10 ˘
“
ˆ
1´ λ
1´ λT`1
˙ Tÿ
t“0
λt
ż
hT`1PHT`1
uX
`
hT`1t
˘
dσ
`
hT`1ďT´1, h
T`1
T
˘ ¨ ¨ ¨ dσ `hT`1ď0 , hT`11 ˘ dσ `∅, hT`10 ˘
“
ˆ
1´ λ
1´ λT`1
˙ Tÿ
t“0
λt
ż
ht`1PHt`1
uX
`
ht`1t
˘
dσ
`
ht`1ďt´1, h
t`1
t
˘ ¨ ¨ ¨ dσ `ht`1ď0 , ht`11 ˘ dσ `∅, ht`10 ˘
“
ˆ
1´ λ
1´ λT`1
˙ Tÿ
t“0
λt
ż
ht`1t PHt`1t
uX
`
ht`1t
˘
dν0t
`
ht`1t
˘
“
ˆ
1´ λ
1´ λT`1
˙ Tÿ
t“0
λt
ż
sPSX\SY
uX psq dν0t psq . (SI.34)
Therefore, we define the average payoff of player X to be
piX :“ lim
TÑ8pi
T`1
X “ p1´ λq
8ÿ
t“0
λt
ż
sPSX\SY
uX psq dν0t psq . (SI.35)
Similarly, the expected payoff of player Y is
piY :“ p1´ λq
8ÿ
t“0
λt
ż
sPSX\SY
uY psq dν0t psq . (SI.36)
A memory-one strategy in the context of randomly-alternating games looks slightly different from that of
strictly-alternating games. Instead of simply reacting to the previous moves of the players, one also needs
to know which player moved last since, in any given round, either X or Y could move (provided ωX ‰ 0, 1).
Therefore, a memory-one strategy for player X consists of an action policy, σXX rxs, when X moves x in the
previous round, and a policy, σYX rys, when Y moves y in the previous round. More succinctly, we let
σX rss :“
#
σXX rss s P SX ,
σYX rss s P SY .
(SI.37)
One final time, our main technical lemma is an analogue of Lemma 3.1 of Akin [2]:
Lemma 3. For memory-one strategies, σXX rxs and σYX rys, and E P F pSXq, we have
8ÿ
t“0
λt
ż
sPSX\SY
”
χE psq ´ λωXσX rss pEq
ı
dν0t psq “ ωXσ0X pEq , (SI.38)
where σX rss is defined via Eq. (SI.37).
Proof. By the definition of the sequence of measures,
 
ν0t
(
tě0,ż
sPSX\SY
χE psq dν0t psq “ ν0t pEq ; (SI.39a)ż
sPSX\SY
ωXσX rss pEq dν0t psq “ ν0t`1 pEq . (SI.39b)
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Therefore, we see that
8ÿ
t“0
λt
ż
sPSX\SY
”
χE psq ´ λωXσX rss pEq
ı
dν0t psq
“
8ÿ
t“0
λt
´
ν0t pEq ´ λν0t`1 pEq
¯
“ ν00 pEq ´ lim
tÑ8λ
t`1ν0t`1 pEq
“ ν00 pEq
“ ωXσ0X pEq , (SI.40)
which completes the proof. 
Proposition 3. For any bounded, measurable function, ψ : SX \ SY Ñ R, with suppψ Ď SX ,
8ÿ
t“0
λt
ż
sPSX\SY
»–ψ psq ´ λωX ż
s1PSX
ψ
`
s1
˘
σX rss
`
s1
˘fifl dν0t psq “ ωX ż
sPSX
ψ psq dσ0X psq . (SI.41)
Proof. The result follows from Lemma 3 and the dominated convergence theorem. We do not include the
details here; the argument is the same as the proof of Proposition 1 of [19]. 
Proposition 3 allows us to prove our main result for randomly-alternating games:
Theorem 3 (Autocratic strategies for randomly-alternating games). If, for some bounded ψ,
αfX pxq ` βfY pxq ` γ “ ψ pxq ´ λωX
ż
sPSX
ψ psq dσXX rxs psq ´ p1´ λqωX
ż
sPSX
ψ psq dσ0X psq ; (SI.42a)
αgX pyq ` βgY pyq ` γ “ ´λωX
ż
sPSX
ψ psq σYX rys psq ´ p1´ λqωX
ż
sPSX
ψ psq dσ0X psq (SI.42b)
for each x P SX and y P SY , then the strategy
`
σ0X , σ
X
X rxs , σYX rys
˘
allows X to enforce the equation
αpiX ` βpiY ` γ “ 0 for every strategy of player Y .
Proof. If Eq. (SI.42) holds, then, by Proposition 3 and Eqs. (SI.35) and (SI.36),
αpiX`βpiY ` γ ` p1´ λqωX
ż
sPSX
ψ psq dσ0X psq
“ p1´ λq
8ÿ
t“0
λt
ż
sPSX\SY
»–ψ psq ´ λωX ż
s1PSX
ψ
`
s1
˘
σX rss
`
s1
˘fifl dν0t psq
“ p1´ λqωX
ż
sPSX
ψ psq dσ0X psq , (SI.43)
from which it follows that αpiX ` βpiY ` γ “ 0, as desired. 
SI.2.1. Two-point autocratic strategies. Suppose that X wishes to enforce αpiX ` βpiY ` γ “ 0 with
σ0X “ p0δs1 ` p1´ p0q δs2 ; (SI.44a)
σXX rxs “ pX pxq δs1 `
´
1´ pX pxq
¯
δs2 ; (SI.44b)
σYX rys “ pY pyq δs1 `
´
1´ pY pyq
¯
δs2 (SI.44c)
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for some s1 and s2 in SX . Consider the function, ϕ : SX \ SY Ñ R, defined by
ϕ psq :“
#
αfX psq ` βfY psq ` γ s P SX ;
αgX psq ` βgY psq ` γ s P SY . (SI.45)
Then, in terms of ϕ, it must be the case that
pX pxq “
1
λωX
´
ψ pxq ´ ϕ pxq ´ p1´ λqωX
´
ψ ps1q p0 ` ψ ps2q p1´ p0q
¯¯
´ ψ ps2q
ψ ps1q ´ ψ ps2q ; (SI.46a)
pY pyq “
1
λωX
´
´ϕ pyq ´ p1´ λqωX
´
ψ ps1q p0 ` ψ ps2q p1´ p0q
¯¯
´ ψ ps2q
ψ ps1q ´ ψ ps2q . (SI.46b)
Therefore, provided 0 ď pX pxq ď 1 and 0 ď pY pyq ď 1 for each x P SX and y P SY , the two-point strategy
defined by Eq. (SI.44) allows player X to unilaterally enforce the relationship αpiX ` βpiY ` γ “ 0.
SI.2.2. Deterministic autocratic strategies. Suppose that X wishes to enforce αpiX ` βpiY ` γ “ 0 by
using a deterministic strategy, which is defined in terms of a reaction function to the previous move of the
game. That is, a deterministic memory-one strategy for player X consists of an initial action, x0 P SX , and
two reaction functions, rX : SX Ñ SX and rY : SY Ñ SX . Player X begins by using x0 with certainty. If
X uses x in the previous round and X moves again, then X plays rX pxq in the subsequent round. On the
other hand, if Y moves y in the previous round and X follows this move, then X plays rY pyq in response to
Y ’s action. For a deterministic strategy with these reaction functions, Eq. (SI.42) takes the form
αfX pxq ` βfY pxq ` γ “ ψ pxq ´ λωXψ
`
rX pxq˘´ p1´ λqωXψ px0q ; (SI.47a)
αgX pyq ` βgY pyq ` γ “ ´λωXψ
`
rY pyq˘´ p1´ λqωXψ px0q . (SI.47b)
SI.3. Continuous Donation Game
The results we give for the continuous Donation Game hold for any benefit and cost functions, b psq and
c psq, and any interval of cooperation levels, r0,Ks “ SX “ SY . For the purposes of plotting feasible regions
(Figs. 3 and SI.1) and for performing simulations (Figs. 4 and 5), we use for benefit and cost functions
b psq :“ 5 `1´ e´2s˘ ; (SI.48a)
c psq :“ 2s, (SI.48b)
respectively, and these functions are defined on the interval r0, 2s “ SX “ SY [see 16, 17].
SI.3.1. Strictly-alternating moves. Fig. SI.1 shows the feasible payoff regions for three values of λ in
the strictly-alternating game when X or Y moves first. Note that these regions depend on the discounting
factor, λ, due to the payoff asymmetries introduced by the sequential moves even for symmetric interactions.
In contrast, in the randomly-alternating, continuous Donation Game, these regions do not depend on λ.
SI.3.1.1. Initial actions. In the main text, we presented two-point autocratic strategies that are concentrated
on just 0 and K. Here, we give the technical requirements of the probability of initially cooperating, p0.
Player X can unilaterally enforce piX ´ κX “ χ ppiY ´ κY q using the reaction probability
p pyq “ λ pb pyq ` χc pyqq ` p1` λq pχκY ´ κXq
λ2 pχb pKq ` c pKqq ´
1´ λ2
λ2
p0, (SI.49)
provided her probability of cooperating in the first round, p0, satisfies
max
"
λ pb pKq`χc pKqq ` p1` λqpχκY ´κXq
p1´ λ2qpχ b pKq ` c pKqq ´
λ2
1´ λ2 , 0
*
ď p0 ď min
"
χκY ´ κX
p1´ λqpχ b pKq` c pKqq , 1
*
.
(SI.50)
Similarly, player X can enforce piY “ γ using the reaction probability
p pyq “ λc pyq ` p1` λq γ
λ2b pKq ´
1´ λ2
λ2
p0, (SI.51)
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Figure SI.1. Feasible payoff regions for three values of λ in the strictly-alternating, con-
tinuous Donation Game when player X moves first (top) and player Y moves first (bottom).
The shaded region represents the feasible payoffs when X plays a two-point strategy (only
0 and K). As the discounting factor, λ, gets smaller (i.e. discounting stronger), the first
move has more of a pronounced effect on the expected payoffs.
provided p0 satisfies
max
"
λc pKq ` p1` λq γ
p1´ λ2q b pKq ´
λ2
1´ λ2 , 0
*
ď p0 ď min
"
γ
p1´ λq b pKq , 1
*
. (SI.52)
SI.3.2. Randomly-alternating moves.
SI.3.2.1. Extortionate and generous strategies. Suppose that, via Eq. (SI.42), X can enforce piX “ χpiY ´ γ
for some χ ě 1 and γ P R. Then, for some bounded function, ψ : r0,Ks Ñ R,
´c pxq ´ χb pxq ` γ “ ψ pxq ´ λωX
ż
sPSX
ψ psq dσXX rxs psq ´ p1´ λqωX
ż
sPSX
ψ psq dσ0X psq ; (SI.53a)
b pyq ` χc pyq ` γ “ ´λωX
ż
sPSX
ψ psq σYX rys psq ´ p1´ λqωX
ż
sPSX
ψ psq dσ0X psq (SI.53b)
for each x, y P r0,Ks “ SX “ SY . Eq. (SI.53a) implies that
p1´ ωXq supψ ď γ ď χb pKq ` c pKq ` p1´ ωXq inf ψ, (SI.54)
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and Eq. (SI.53b) implies that
´ωX supψ ď γ ď ´b pKq ´ χc pKq ´ ωX inf ψ. (SI.55)
It follows at once from these inequalities that
0 ď γ ď χ
´
ωXb pKq ´ p1´ ωXq c pKq
¯
´
´
p1´ ωXq b pKq ´ ωXc pKq
¯
. (SI.56)
In particular, if γ “ χκY ´ κX , then it must be true that
κX “ κX `
`
χκ00Y ´ κ00X
˘ ď χκY ď κX ` `χκKKY ´ κKKX ˘ , (SI.57)
which is simply Eq. (13) in the main text.
SI.3.2.2. Equalizer strategies – own score. Player X can ensure that piX “ γ if σX satisfies
´c pxq ´ γ “ ψ pxq ´ λωX
ż
sPSX
ψ psq dσXX rxs psq ´ p1´ λqωX
ż
sPSX
ψ psq dσ0X psq ; (SI.58a)
b pyq ´ γ “ ´λωX
ż
sPSX
ψ psq σYX rys psq ´ p1´ λqωX
ż
sPSX
ψ psq dσ0X psq (SI.58b)
for some bounded function, ψ, and each x, y P r0,Ks. Eq. (SI.58a) implies that
γ ď ´p1´ ωXq supψ (SI.59)
and Eq. (SI.58b) implies that
γ ď ωX supψ, (SI.60)
thus γ ď 0. Therefore, player X can unilaterally set her own score to at most 0. However, it should be noted
that, in contrast to the continuous Donation Game with simultaneous moves, it is possible for a player to set
her own score (to at most 0) when moves alternate randomly. For example, if γ “ 0 and ψ psq “ ´ 1λωX b psq,
then player X can unilaterally set piX “ 0 using
σ0X “ δ0; (SI.61a)
σXX rxs “
´
1´ pX pxq
¯
δ0 ` pX pxq δK ; (SI.61b)
σYX rys “ δy, (SI.61c)
where pX pxq “ 1bpKq
´
1
λωX
b pxq ´ c pxq
¯
, provided λωX is sufficiently close to 1. Interestingly, however, if
players move with equal probability, ωX “ 1{2, then player X can never set her own score: Eq. (SI.58)
implies that λωX ě bpKqbpKq`cpKq ą 1{2, which can never hold for ωX “ 1{2 and 0 ď λ ď 1. Even when a player
can set her own score in the continuous Donation Game, this score can be at most 0; thus, since a player
can achieve at least 0 by defecting in every round, such an equalizer strategy would never be attractive.
SI.3.2.3. Equalizer strategies – opponent’s score. We saw in §4.4 that player X can set piY “ γ for any
0 ď γ ď ωXb pKq ´ p1´ ωXq c pKq. Here, we show that, using Eq. (8), there are no other payoffs for player
Y that X can set unilaterally. Indeed, suppose
b pxq ´ γ “ ψ pxq ´ λωX
ż
sPSX
ψ psq dσXX rxs psq ´ p1´ λqωX
ż
sPSX
ψ psq dσ0X psq ; (SI.62a)
´c pyq ´ γ “ ´λωX
ż
sPSX
ψ psq σYX rys psq ´ p1´ λqωX
ż
sPSX
ψ psq dσ0X psq (SI.62b)
for some bounded function, ψ, and each x, y P r0,Ks. From Eq. (SI.62a), we see that
´p1´ ωXq inf ψ ď γ ď b pKq ´ p1´ ωXq supψ. (SI.63)
Similarly, Eq. (SI.62b) implies that
ωX inf ψ ď γ ď ´c pKq ` ωX supψ. (SI.64)
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These inequalities immediately give 0 ď γ ď min
!
b pKq ´ p1´ ωXq supψ,´c pKq ` ωX supψ
)
. Since
b pKq ´ p1´ ωXq supψ ď ´c pKq ` ωX supψ ðñ b pKq ` c pKq ď supψ, (SI.65)
it follows that 0 ď γ ď ωXb pKq ´ p1´ ωXq c pKq “ κKKY .
SI.3.2.4. Initial actions. Here, we give the technical conditions on p0, the probability that X cooperates
in the first round, that must be satisfied for her to be able to enforce various linear payoff relationships
(extortionate, generous, and equalizer) using a two-point autocratic strategy.
Using the reaction probabilities defined by
pX pxq “ b pxq ` χc pxq ` χκY ´ κX
λωX pχ` 1qpb pKq ` c pKqq ´
1´ λ
λ
p0; (SI.66a)
pY pyq “ pX pyq , (SI.66b)
player X can enforce piX ´ κX “ χ ppiY ´ κY q provided p0 satisfies
max
"
b pKq ` χc pKq ` χκY ´ κX
p1´ λqωXpχ` 1q pb pKq ` c pKqq ´
λ
1´ λ, 0
*
ď p0 ď min
"
χκY ´ κX
p1´ λqωXpχ` 1q pb pKq ` c pKqq , 1
*
.
(SI.67)
Similarly, player X can ensure piY “ γ by using the reaction probabilities
pX pxq “ c pxq ` γ
λωX pb pKq ` c pKqq ´
1´ λ
λ
p0; (SI.68a)
pY pyq “ pX pyq (SI.68b)
as long as p0 falls within the range
max
"
c pKq ` γ
p1´ λqωX pb pKq ` c pKqq ´
λ
1´ λ, 0
*
ď p0 ď min
"
γ
p1´ λqωX pb pKq ` c pKqq , 1
*
. (SI.69)
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